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BIANNUAL SURVEY
CPLR 302 is somewhat eqpuivocal. In such a situation, however,
since the language does not compel it, and since the CPLR is
intended to be construed liberally,'7 there appears to be no valid
reason why the courts should hold that a "gap" exists which would
enable a defendant to evade the jurisdiction of New York.
CPLR 302(a)(1): Limited partner held subject to personal juris-
diction on basis of his endorsement outside New York of a
note for benefit of the New York partnership.
In order to exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary, the
requirements of the CPLR and of federal "due process" must be
satisfied. Under CPLR 302(a) (1), jurisdiction is asserted over a
non-domiciliary who "transacts any business" in New York and is
sued in connection with that business. In Longines-Wittnauer
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc.,"" the Court of Appeals
stated that the test for jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) is
whether the non-domiciliary has "engaged in some purposeful
activity in this state in connection with the matter in suit." '- The
United States Supreme Court, in comparison, has stated that "due
process" requires for valid in personam jurisdiction "some act by
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protection of its laws." 20  The similarity of the two
tests indicates that the Court of Appeals has interpreted the intent
of the New York legislature, by its enactment of 302, as utilizing
its full constitutional power in exercising jurisdiction over non-
domiciliaries who have business contacts with this state.
The full extent to which this jurisdiction will extend has not,
as yet, been ascertained. Its comprehensiveness, however, is in-
dicated by the recent appellate division case of Banco Espanol de
Credito v. DuPont,2' wherein the defendant, having only minimal
contacts with New York, was held subject to New York's juris-
diction. In this case, a suit on a promissory note, the non-
domiciliary defendant's only contact with New York was his status
as an accommodation endorser on the promissory note of a
Delaware corporation for the purpose of giving a New York
partnership, -in which he was a limited partner, the benefit of his
credit.
Justice Steuer voiced a strong dissent to the majority's holding
that the defendant was subject to in personam jurisdiction under
1 CPLR 104.
1s 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
19 Id. at 457, 209 N.E.2d at 75, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
20 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
2124 App. Div. 2d 445, 261 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1965) (memorandum
opinion).
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CPLR 302 (a) (1). He stated that neither the note nor the
endorsement had any substantial contact with New York-the note
was executed, delivered and endorsed outside New York. The dis-
sent further maintained that the fact that defendant was a limited
partner in the New York partnership was immaterial since this
was no more a basis for jurisdiction than would be the fact that a
non-domiciliary defendant owned stock in a New York corporation.
The dissent's comparison of a limited partner to a shareholder
is quite appropriate since both are mere investors who have lmited
liability and who do not partake in the management of the business 22
It is submitted, therefore, that Justice Steuer was correct in his
view that the mere fact that one is a limited partner would be
insufficient as a basis for jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary. It is
also submitted that he is correct in his assertion that a simple
endorsement of a promissory note outside of New York would
not effect in personam jurisdiction. In such a case it is difficult
to imagine what business the non-domiciliary transacted in New
York.
What the dissent appears to overlook, however, is that a much
stronger basis for jurisdiction exists when, as in the instant case,
the defendant is both a limited partner in the New York partnership
and the endorser of a note for the benefit of the partnership. As
indicated by the Court of Appeals in the Longines case, it is not
any one factor which determines whether the defendant has
transacted any business in New York within the meaning of 302
(a) (1). Rather, it is the totality of the defendant's contacts with
New York in connection with the matter in suit.23
In the instant case, the majority would probably have held
the same way if the defendant had been a shareholder in a New
York corporation and had endorsed a note for the benefit of the
corporation. In such a situation, as in the instant case, the defendant
would be an investor in a New York business who was promoting,
at least indirectly, his own financial interests by extending to the
business the benefit of his credit. The result reached in the
instant case appears to satisfy both federal due process requirements
and the jurisdictional test approved by the Court of Appeals since
it may reasonably be said that the defendant has engaged in purpose-
ful activity in New York and has been sued in connection with this
activity.
22 See Nadler, The Limited Partnership Under the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 65 Com. LJ. 71 (1960) for a good analysis of the basic
tenets of the limited partner and his similarity to a corporation shareholder.23 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke Inc., 15 N.Y.2d
443, 458, 209 N.E.2d 68, 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965).
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